SummaryThis report describes a family planning KAP survey conducted in 2000 households in rural Ghana between April and October, 1972, as one of the Danfa Project’s baseline studies. Subsequent re-surveys were done in 1975 and 1977 to assess changes related to project health education and family planning programmes.Reported knowledge about family planning was three times that reported in previous studies in rural Ghana. About 70% of the respondents approve of family planning, but most want a large family, with over six (...) children. At all ages, males wanted two or three more children than did women.The current 3% population growth rate in Ghana may increase due to continued early age of marriage, the rising size of the reproductive age group and improved pregnancy outcome.Although the expected relationships between knowledge and use of family planning and age and education were present, these differentials were typically only 10–15%. In the project area it appears that women will be most important in making the decision to practise family planning, although motivation of males is being stressed.Most villagers hear about family planning through informal, word-of-mouth channels with relatively little use of news media, family planning workers or clinic health personnel. To improve the practice of family planning, village-based health educators are working with volunteers including traditional birth attendants, community leaders, teachers and church groups. (shrink)

To give concrete meaning to the phrase "Art for Life's Sake," Jenkins assumes that "the general purpose that animates all of man's activities and artifacts is adaptation to the environment and satisfaction of the conditions of life." A phenomenological survey of human experience reveals three basic modes of viewing or adapting to the world--the affective, the cognitive, and the aesthetic. Each is intertwined with the others, and all three are necessary if man is to adapt to his environment; but as (...) one or another mode dominates experience, attention is focused on the self, the relatedness of entities, and the particular entities themselves. The view of art that emerges is a reformulation of the imitation theory; skillfully and systematically applied to the persistent facts of aesthetic life, it offers solid, common-sense illumination of traditionally obscure problems.--D. W. S. (shrink)

Leclerc's systematic introduction is predicated upon the thesis that "Whitehead's basic problems belong to the great tradition of philosophical inquiry first opened up by the Greeks." A lucid discussion of the traditional problems surrounding "being" leads simply and logically to a consideration of the categories in terms of which Whitehead reformulates the traditional approach to "that which is." The great merit of this progression is that it dispels the illusion, so overwhelming on an initial glance at Whitehead himself, that his (...) terminology is arbitrary and completely disassociated from traditional usage.--D. W. S. (shrink)

This volume follows by eighteen years Mays's earlier study, which was titled simply The Philosophy of Whitehead. The strongly stated, controversial working hypothesis behind that work was that even though Whitehead introduces a fiercely complicated vocabulary in his later books, especially in Process and Reality, "the ideas contained in his later work are much simpler than is usually assumed, since he is working out some of his earlier ideas on a larger philosophical canvas". In short, the 1959 book by Mays (...) was based upon a sharp denial that Process and Reality involves "a radical departure from [Whitehead's] early writings". (shrink)

In this study of aesthetics during the eight decades from 1755 to 1833, Will argues that those thinkers who steered away from the dualistic, neo-classical concern with ideal beauty and turned to a monistic, organic approach to the intelligibility of beauty were pushing the Platonic-Plotinian tradition toward clearer thought concerning beauty, and were also laying the groundwork for Hegel's idealism. He concludes that Hegel's systematization of this strand of thought constitutes "an oblique argument in favor of the major tradition of (...) philosophical idealism."--D. W. S. (shrink)

This is a book with a highly unorthodox, idiosyncratic thesis, but because of the author's deep familiarity with the Whiteheadian materials, because of the power given to her analysis by its all-encompassing scope, because of the genuinely important issues which cluster around her theme, and also, undoubtedly, because of the unabashed bravado with which this Don Quixote of the process set breaks lances with virtually all of the established authors in the field, this book will probably be widely read.

In 1947 Professor Dorner published The Way beyond 'Art'--The Work of Herbert Bayer. That book was one-half a series of startling generalizations dealing with the development of the visual arts, mind and nature, and one-half a series of perceptive and interesting insights into the work of the modern artist-designer, Herbert Bayer. In this posthumous, revised edition, the half dealing specifically with Bayer is omitted. What remains is Dorner's unusual history of art, which traces the dissolution of three-dimensional reality and the (...) rise of the "Modern Realism," which Dorner celebrates as "positively illustrating the physicist's new vision of the world."--D. W. S. (shrink)

Beardsley's aim is "to see whether the problems [of aesthetics] cannot be formulated better than they usually are." Though he relies heavily upon the techniques of logical analysis in this study he does not make analysis the substance of inquiry, but utilizes it to render manageable the problems involved in evaluating art. Each chapter is followed by extensive "Notes and Queries" liberally sprinkled with references to books and articles bearing on the problems discussed. --D. W. S.

Recently Mr. E. Courtney has reopened discussion on the authenticity of the last six Heroides, a subject which had almost universally been accepted as settled by scholars.2 He also briefly discussed the ninth epistle and examined certain grounds for doubting whether it is rightly included in the Ovidian canon. In this he is following Karl Lachmann, who was disposed to doubt the authenticity not only of the last six but also of those of the remainder which are not mentioned in (...) Ovid's catalogue of the epistles given at Amores 2. 18 f.3 This despoliation of the canon has not generally found favour since Lachmann, and in the case of Heroides 9 the editors and other scholars working on the poems 4 have without exception regarded the poem as a genuine specimen of Ovid's work. (shrink)

A work in this genre inevitably invites comparison with the 1953 anthology of Vivas and Krieger. Though containing some duplication of the contents of the earlier volume, Weitz's collection makes many additional, fine selections available--e. g., three examples of Erwin Panofsky's techniques; Hospers' "The Concept of Artistic Expression"; Malraux on style; Chapter IX of Cassirer's Essay on Man; and a direct encounter in which Erich Kahler has prepared a traditional, humanistic rebuttal to Weitz's own contention that 'art' cannot be defined. (...) A good anthology.--D. W. S. (shrink)

About each of six men, W. R. Inge, P. E. More, A. E. Taylor, William Temple, and G. Santayana, the author asks two questions: How does he interpret Plato and/or the Platonic tradition? What are the central elements in his religious thought? Geoghegan's general conclusion: though agreeing in their ethical Theism, moral idealism, ambivalent view of Nature, and reliance upon God to relate essence and existence, Platonism and Christianity have not been united ; with Whitehead and Santayana, naturalism has precluded (...) an adequate expression of either original or traditional Platonism.--D. W. S. (shrink)

Through 1886 to 1889 understanding of the mechanism of telephone transmission was transformed from an electrostatic and traditional view to an electrodynamic one conforming with Maxwell's scheme. Observed at the level of commercial application this painful adjustment occurred via a sequence of controversies connected with self-induction—on techniques of telephony, on electrical measurement, on lightning conductors and on matters of professional ethics—in which the parts played by evidence, by theory, and by authority were strangely mixed. The well-known confrontation of O. Heaviside (...) and W. H. Preece was at the centre of the debate. An open division between traditionalists and progressives amongst electrical engineers was provoked, and the effectiveness of mathematical theory as against pure pragmatism at the practical level had in the end to be conceded. (shrink)

There are certain metaphysical theories which present a view of the world and of the position of human-beings within it which have seemed attractive or at least impressive to many irrespective of the arguments that are marshalled in their favour. That is certainly true of Schopenhauer. His identification of the inner nature of reality with the will, and the conclusions which he drew from this as regards the nature of human-beings and their place in the world, have seemed striking and (...) perhaps even illuminating to many thinkers, not all of whom have been philosophers in the most obvious sense and not all of whom have had much concern for the underlying argument that led Schopenhauer to his conclusions. It is in this way too, perhaps, that certain of Schopenhauer's ideas have become well known—his emphasis on the will to live, his pessimism and his views on suicide, and his thoughts about human nature and about sex that have been seen as something of an anticipation of Freud. In recent times attention has also been directed to his influence on Wittgenstein. In all these respects, however, it is Schopenhauer's ideas that have been influential, rather than the argument that underlies them. Indeed it is sometimes said that Schopenhauer was not a very systematic thinker at all. If that seems true it is so in the sense that Kant too has seemed to some unsystematic in the details of his argument. That does not mean that the main structure of the argument is not clear. So it is with Schopenhauer. (shrink)

This paper presents my personal convictions, as an Evangelical, regarding the absolute impropriety of doctor-assisted suicide for Christians. They have been “bought with a price” and are owned by Another. Hence, they must always strive to glorify God in their bodies, both in life and in death. Although they crave the well-being of temporal health, when they are ill seek healing or relief, and may well recoil even from the thought of suffering and dying, they should realize that their values (...) and priorities must be rooted in biblical truths and that their well-being is eternal and not temporal, spiritual and not material. As Christians, their attitudes and responses to suffering and dying must be molded by the reality that their Creator and Sovereign will cause all things to work together for their good and that their Lord has called them into a fellowship of His suffering in which they are sustained by dependence upon Him. Hence, for Christians to take their lives in order to escape from the trials and testings ordained by Him would be a failure of love and a breach of trust. (shrink)

The traditional empiricist view of perception is that in perception we receive information through the senses of the so-called external world. This idea is reflected in the notions of the ‘given’ and of 1‘data’ which have figured so largely in theories of perception. Even if philosophers of this persuasion have gone on to say something about what we do with the data, it remains true that at rock bottom and in the last resort perception is thought of as something passive. (...) I have tried to chart the historical issues elsewhere, and I shall not repeat anything about them here. That is not my concern. I am here interested in the question whether the notion of a purely passive perceiver makes any sense in itself. That it does not has been suggested by philosophers on occasion. There are some brief remarks to that effect in G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention ; and Stuart Hampshire’s Thought and Action lays great weight on action in connection with our awareness of the world, although I do not myself believe that the exact nature of the connection is clearly worked out by him. Some aspects of his views, however, have been taken up by Campbell Garnett with explicit reference to perception in his The Perceptual Process, with a resulting theory that bears more than a superficial resemblance to that of Maine de Biran. (shrink)

There has been a good deal of interest in recent years in what Franz Brentano had to say about the notion of ‘intentional objects’ and about intentionality as a criterion of the mental. There has been less interest in his classification of mental phenomena. In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano asserts and argues for the thesis that mental phenomena can be classified in terms of three kinds of mental act or activity, all of which are directed towards an (...) immanent object. These are, respectively, presentation, judgment and what he calls the phenomena of love and hate. Once again, less interest has been shown in what he has to say about the last of these three than in what he says about the others. I wish to take Brentano's views as the point of departure for a discussion of love and hate, since these notions seem to me to have a good deal of philosophical interest, for at least two main reasons. First, I have recently had some concern with the part that personal relations play in our understanding of others and of ourselves, and love and hate seem to be very important elements in such relations. Second, love and hate have long seemed to me to provide important counter-examples to some prevalent philosophical theories about the emotions. I shall take this issue first. (shrink)

Whitehead's remarks on man, social problems, education, religion, and history have been extracted from his technical works and placed side by side to form an account in familiar terminology of Whitehead's theory of civilization. In context, occurring almost as afterthoughts illustrating abstract metaphysical principles, these remarks constitute brilliant flashes of humanistic insight; abstracted from context, they become platitudinous. Only when, in the final chapter, Johnson adumbrates their metaphysical setting, does one feel any of the excitement of seeing the values of (...) Western democracy emerge from a speculative account of the nature of things. --D. W. S. (shrink)

Human aesthetic experiences are pervasive; they are triggered by faces, art, natural scenery, foods, ideas, theories, and decision-making situations, among many sources, and seem to be a distinctive trait of our species. Our moral sense, understood as our capacity to judge events, actions, or people as good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, also seems to be an exclusively human endowment (Ayala 2010). As part of the scientific efforts to characterize the biological foundations of our human uniqueness, recently there has been (...) interest in the brain’s underpinnings of aesthetic reactions to art on the one hand, and in the neural correlates of moral judgment and decision-making on the other (Greene and Paxton .. (shrink)

The ethical implications of the growth of for-profit health care institutions are complex. Two major moral criticisms of for-profit medicine are analyzed. The first claim is that for-profit health care institutions fail to fulfill their obligations to do their fair share in providing health care to the poor and so exacerbate the problem of access to health care. The second claim is that profit seeking in medicine will damage the physician-patient relationship, creating conflicts of interest that will diminish the quality (...) of care and erode patients' trust in their physicians and the public's trust in the medical profession. The authors conclude that while the continued expansion of for-profit health care may exacerbate in some respects problems of access, trust and conflicts of interest, it is a mistake to consider these problems as unique to for-profit health care; they are problems for not for-profit health care as well. Though these issues justify continuing moral concern, they do not at this time provide decisive grounds for substantially curbing or eliminating for-profit enterprise in health care. (shrink)

In the earlier sections of part one of the "critique of judgment," discussing natural beauty, Kant describes the aesthetical or beautiful in strongly formalistic terms. In the closing sections of this part, Discussing fine art, He characterizes the aesthetical or beautiful in predominantly expressionistic terms. The puzzle is not that these views are different but that our philosopher seems to think they are identical. Various hypotheses that claim to explain this puzzle are examined. The key suggested is kant's background or (...) approach. In analysing the aesthetical, Kant is looking for evidence of a harmony between natural fact and moral aspiration, Nature and freedom. For this purpose the aesthetical as form seems best in the field of natural beauty, And the aesthetical as expression in the field of fine art. (shrink)